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Abstract 
 
While studies examining free votes find MPs’ preferences influence their voting behaviour, most 
studies also show MPs tend to divide along party lines even after the whips have been 
withdrawn. Recent work offers a possible alternative explanation for this finding: this sustained 
party cohesion represents the impact of MPs’ party identification similar to party identification 
effects in the electorate. This argument is tested using a series of free votes on same-sex 
relations. Even after controlling for preferences using several direct measures, party continues to 
shape voting behaviour. Although indirect, this provides evidence in favour of the party-as-
identification argument.   
 
 
Notes 
 
We would like to thank Pippa Norris for generously sharing the British Representation Study 
data with us.  All responsibility for their use, and especially any errors, belongs to us. 
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British parties are known for their strict discipline.  Though backbench dissent has been 
on the rise in recent years (Cowley and Stuart, 2012), historically, Members of Parliament (MPs) 
in the House of Commons have followed the party line—or been compelled by their party’s 
whips to maintain the party line—on most divisions.  Even after the whips have been withdrawn, 
a sizable body of research examining ‘free votes’ (un-whipped divisions) finds that parties often 
remain highly cohesive.  Most of these studies maintain that the sustained effect of ‘party’ on 
these divisions reflects the shared preferences of party members (e.g. Cowley and Stuart, 2010; 
Hibbing and Marsh, 1987; Marsh and Read, 1988; Mughan and Scully, 1997; Plumb, 2013, 
2015).   
Recently, however, an alternative explanation of ‘party’ effects has emerged maintaining 
that MPs’ party identifications also influence their voting behaviour.  Similar to party 
identification in the electorate (Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002), 
this argument holds that MPs feel psychological attachments to their parties and are socialised in 
ways that compel them to act in the best interests of the party, even if their personal preferences 
do not line up with the party’s interests (Norton, 2003; Raymond and Overby, 2014; Russell, 
2014; see also Plumb and Marsh, 2013).  The implications of this argument are clear: net of 
personal preferences, MPs of the same party will vote en bloc.  However, this argument has yet 
to be subjected to proper empirical scrutiny, as the one direct test of the party-as-identification 
argument (Raymond and Overby, 2014) examined only one division, which questions the 
generalisability of that study’s findings.  Thus, further empirical scrutiny is needed before one 
can conclude that MPs’ party identifications indeed shape their voting behaviour.   
Towards this end, this paper examines the impact of party identification on a series of 
free votes dealing with same-sex relations.  Free votes are interesting divisions in which to 
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examine the voting behaviour of MPs because they are votes held on what are often divisive 
moral issues that genuinely allow MPs to vote according to the dictates of their consciences 
without fear of repercussions from party leaders (Richards, 1970).  As a result, this allows us to 
rule out effects related to party whips’ efforts to maintain discipline.   
As previous research shows that ‘party’ continues to impact voting behaviour on free 
votes, most have taken this as evidence that cohesion occurs due to the shared preferences of 
MPs of the same party.  However, if ‘party’ continued to influence MPs’ voting behaviour even 
after accounting for MPs’ preferences, this would demonstrate that shared preferences alone 
cannot explain the sustained party cohesion observed on such free votes.  Although we lack 
specific measures of party identification, this would provide support for the notion that MPs 
party identifications impact voting behaviour.   
In most cases, reaching such conclusions—regarding the effects of both party 
identification and personal preferences—is hampered by the fact that researchers lack direct 
measures of MPs’ preferences.  Some research attempts to measure MPs’ preferences using 
previous voting behaviour (e.g. Plumb, 2015; Plumb and Marsh, 2011); however, such measures 
are problematic for two main reasons.  For one, voting might not reflect MPs’ true preferences 
(e.g. such votes may be tactical, reflecting pressures from constituents instead of their own 
preferences).  Second, the bills that are voted on are not randomly selected, as party leaders are 
loathe to allow bills to the floor that divide their caucuses (e.g. Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug, 2008; 
Cox and McCubbins, 2005).  As a result, direct measures of MPs’ preferences are preferable.   
To measure MPs’ preferences, this paper makes use of a rare data set surveying MPs in 
the House of Commons.  Namely, we use the British Representation Study 1997 (Norris and 
Lovenduski, 1997), which includes a range of questions measuring preferences relevant to voting 
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on the issue of same-sex relations.  Should we find that party continues to influence voting 
behaviour even after controlling for MPs’ preferences, the fact we have precise measures of 
MPs’ preferences specific to the issue at hand would increase our confidence in concluding that 
this residual party effect is not merely capturing some unmeasured preference—thereby 
providing indirect evidence of a party-as-identification effect.   
The next section discusses the details of our analysis and interprets the results.  
Specifically, we examine whether support for several bills that sought to standardise age-of-
consent laws for same-sex relationships was determined solely by MPs’ personal preferences, or 
whether there is evidence to suggest MPs’ party identifications also affected their voting 
behaviour.  We first discuss the details of the four free vote divisions examined in the empirical 
analysis before outlining the research design and discussing the results of our regression models 
predicting support for each division.  A concluding section discusses the implications of our 
findings for the larger body of research examining voting behaviour on free votes, as well as 
future avenues for research regarding the party identification of MPs.   
Analysis of Four Free Vote Divisions 
We examine MPs’ voting behaviour on four divisions relating to efforts to standardise 
laws regarding age of consent for consensual sexual acts—specifically, to reduce the age of 
consent for certain homosexual acts (namely, anal sex) to 16.  Proponents of these efforts argued 
that reducing the age of consent to 16 was necessary to eliminate sexual orientation-based 
discrimination against males.  An initial attempt to reduce the age of consent was made with a 
proposed amendment to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (see the debate in Hansard on 22 June 
1998, column 709).  This amendment was passed on second reading, but was later rejected by 
the House of Lords.  Rather than confront the House of Lords, the Blair government dropped this 
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amendment from the Crime and Disorder Act and introduced a new, separate bill, which 
eventually became the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000.  This bill initially passed on 
second reading on 25 January 1999 (see Hansard on that date at column 20), but was again 
rejected by the House of Lords.  Invoking the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 in order to over-
ride the Lords’ suspensive veto, the House of Commons passed the bill again on second reading 
on 10 February 2000 (Hansard, column 432).  The bill then passed on third reading on 28 
February 2000 (Hansard, column 127), receiving royal assent on 30 February 2000.   
As one can see in Table 1, which presents the percentages of the three major parties’ MPs 
voting in favour of standardising age-of-consent laws, each division broke down along party 
lines.  (Because only a handful of MPs from Northern Ireland and the nationalist parties in 
Scotland and Wales voted on each measure, we omit these MPs from Table 1.)  For the sake of 
reference, the percentages of each party’s MPs voting to standardise age-of-consent laws 
obtained from the sample of MPs included in the British Representation Study are presented in 
parentheses.  On each division, Labour MPs were nearly unanimous in their support for 
standardising age-of-consent laws, with no fewer than 94 per cent of Labour MPs voting in 
favour.  Only slightly less cohesive in their support, Liberal Democrat MPs voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of standardising age-of-consent laws, with between 84 and 93 per cent 
of Liberal Democrat MPs supporting each measure.  To a nearly equal degree, the overwhelming 
majority of Conservative MPs voted against standardising age-of-consent laws, with 
Conservative support on each division ranging from roughly 6 to 15 per cent.  With the 
exception of Conservative MPs (more on this point below), these percentages are reflected 
closely in the sample of MPs interviewed by the British Representation Study.  Thus, while MPs 
were free to vote their consciences, most still chose to vote along party lines.   
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While MPs clearly divided along party lines on all four divisions, what remains to be 
seen is whether this sustained cohesion can be explained solely by the shared preferences among 
MPs of the same party, or whether there is evidence to suggest that MPs’ party identifications 
also shaped their voting behaviour.  To test the party-as-identification argument, we examine 
support for each of these four divisions, coding those MPs voting in favour of standardising age-
of-consent laws as one and zero for those voting against.  We include several variables to control 
for MPs’ preferences.  The British Representation Study included four variables measuring 
attitudes towards issues directly relevant to both the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 amendment 
and the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000.  On three questions, MPs were asked whether 
homosexual relations are always wrong,1 whether young people lack respect for traditional 
values, and whether censorship is necessary to uphold moral standards; responses for each 
question ranged from zero (disagree strongly) to four (agree strongly).  A fourth question asked 
whether people should be tolerant of unconventional lives, with responses ranging from zero 
(agree strongly) to four (disagree strongly).  These variables are turned into an additive social 
conservatism scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.66), ranging from zero (more socially liberal attitudes) 
to 16 (more socially conservative attitudes).  This variable allows us to control for the ideological 
liberalism/conservatism of MPs, which previous research has shown to play a strong role in 
determining voting behaviour on free votes (Plumb, 2013; 2014; Plumb and Marsh, 2011; Read, 
Marsh, and Richards, 1994).   
We include three additional variables to control for MPs’ preferences.  Because the social 
conservatism scale may not fully capture all aspects of the underlying ideology affecting MPs’ 
voting behaviour on free votes noted by previous research, we also include MPs’ left-right self-
placements using a scale ranging from zero to nine (left to right).  To control for the possibility 
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that higher education breeds the sort of tolerance on moral issues that might lead MPs to support 
this bill, we include a variable coded one for those MPs possessing a university degree and zero 
otherwise.  Recognising that gender has played an increasing role in shaping the behaviour of 
MPs on free votes (Cowley and Stuart, 2010; Plumb, 2013; 2014), we also include a variable 
coded one for female MPs and zero otherwise.   
Additionally, we control for constituency pressures that may either pull MPs away from 
the rest of their parties and towards their constituents’ preferences or push them towards the rest 
of their fellow MPs (Norton and Wood, 1993; Overby, Raymond, and Taydas, 2011; Pattie, 
Fieldhouse, and Johnston, 1994).  Specifically, we include a variable measuring the percentage 
of Christians in MPs’ constituencies using data from the 2001 Census.2  MPs representing 
constituencies with more Christians may feel pressure to vote against each measure whilst MPs 
from more secular constituencies may feel pressure to support the reduction in age of consent.   
Finally, we include a variable coded one for Conservative MPs and zero otherwise.  
Though we lack direct measures of party identification, if party remains significant after 
accounting for the effects of MPs’ preferences and constituency pressures, this would provide 
evidence MPs’ party identifications shaped their voting behaviour.  We focus on Conservative 
MPs because opposition to the reduction in the age of consent on each division came primarily 
from the Conservative ranks.  Because the attempt to standardise of age-of-consent laws was 
supported by the Blair government, some Conservative MPs—including those MPs indifferent to 
or even supportive of same-sex relationship equality—may have been motivated to vote against 
the measure principally because it was supported by the Labour leadership (even though the 
government was not so committed to the bill as to enforce discipline among its cabinet or 
backbenches).  It is important to note that because the British Representation Study sample over-
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represents the percentage of Conservatives deviating from the rest of the party (i.e. it under-
represents Conservative unity), this will bias the results by under-estimating the impact of 
Conservative party identification on voting behaviour in the analysis conducted here.  Thus, the 
results presented below can be viewed as conservative estimates of the impact of party 
identification 
To estimate support for each division, we use logistic regression.  Parameter estimates for 
all four models are presented in Table 2.  Each model has satisfactory fit, correctly predicting 
more than 90 per cent of the votes in our sample.   
The results show the most consistently significant preference variable is the social 
conservatism scale, which is negatively signed in each model.  This indicates that the likelihood 
of voting in favour of each measure declines as one’s degree of social conservatism increases.3  
While those MPs placing themselves to the right are significantly less likely to vote in favour of 
the amendment to the Crime and Disorder Act, left-right ideology does not impact voting 
behaviour on any of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act divisions.  Those with university 
educations are significantly more likely to vote for the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act on 
third reading, but are not significantly different on the other three divisions.  Female MPs are 
significantly more likely to vote in favour of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act on second 
reading in 1999, but not significantly different in their voting behaviour on other divisions.   
Even after controlling for preferences, however, party remains a statistically significant 
predictor in each model.  The negative coefficient indicates that Conservative MPs are 
significantly less likely to vote in favour of standardising age-of-consent laws on each division.  
Thus, while ‘party’ defined as shared preferences plays a big role, preferences alone cannot 
explain this sustained party effect.  This, in turn, suggests MPs’ party identification may have 
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shaped their voting behaviour on these four divisions.   
To put the impact of each variable in some perspective, Table 3 presents the predicted 
changes in probabilities for each variable when moving from their lowest to their highest values 
(holding all other variables at their medians) using the results from each model.  In all four 
models, party plays a major role, substantially decreasing the predicted probabilities of voting for 
each bill.  Support for the second and third readings of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act in 
2000 is 38 and 39 percentage points, respectively, lower among Conservative than all other MPs.  
While the predicted decrease in the probability of voting for the proposed amendment to the 
Crime and Disorder Bill 1998 associated with party is somewhat smaller (decreasing by 27 per 
cent), Conservative MPs are 72 percentage points less likely to vote in favour of the second 
reading of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act in 1999.  These effects are sizable in relation 
to the impact of preferences and constituency pressures, exceeding the effects of nearly every 
preference measure.  While the estimated effects of social conservatism are greater than the 
estimated effects of party, the changes in probabilities due to party rival the changes in 
probabilities due to social conservatism in all but the model predicting support for the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act on second reading in 2000 (and even then the effect of party is 
nearly half the size of the change in probability due to social conservatism).  Thus, the estimated 
effects of party are quite strong.   
Discussion 
Though the whips are withdrawn on free votes, ‘party’ continues to exert an effect on 
MPs’ voting behaviour.  While most previous studies argue that this sustained party cohesion 
occurs because MPs of the same party possess similar preferences, an alternative argument holds 
that party cohesion is also maintained by MPs’ party identification.  Given the paucity of tests of 
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this argument, this paper has examined the voting behaviour of MPs on four divisions in order to 
determine the robustness of this party-as-identification argument.  Using specific measures of 
preferences, the results show that, consistent with previous literature, MPs’ preferences exert 
strong effects on the voting behaviour of MPs.  However, the results also suggest the lingering 
effect of ‘party’ on free votes seen in previous research may not be due solely to shared 
preferences among MPs of the same party: even after controlling for MPs’ preferences, ‘party’ 
still has an impact on MPs’ voting behaviour on these four divisions.  Though this only 
constitutes an indirect test of the party identification argument, the results suggest party 
identification may also explain MPs’ voting behaviour.  If correct, the findings presented above 
suggest the continued effect of party seen in previous studies of voting behaviour on free votes 
may have reflected more than simply the shared preferences of MPs belonging to the same party.   
While these findings suggest the party-as-identification argument deserves serious 
consideration, further research is still needed to corroborate these findings.  Particularly, future 
research employing more direct measures of party identification is needed in order to 
demonstrate that the party identification of MPs—and not some hitherto unexplored factor 
related to the party affiliation of MPs—indeed shapes their voting behaviour.  Though the lack of 
such alternative explanations for the residual party effect seen above provides support for the 
party-as-identification argument, future research must provide more direct evidence of party 
identification effects.   
Additionally, even though this study corroborates the findings in Raymond and Overby 
(2014), it is difficult to say conclusively that party identification effects are present on every free 
vote—let alone all divisions (or in all legislatures)—on the basis of a handful of free votes 
dealing with specific issues.  Because of this, future research examining the impact of party 
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identification will have to grapple not only with different issues but also different types of 
divisions, especially whipped divisions, if this party identification argument can be viewed as 
truly generalizable.  This is particularly important considering that party leaders strategically 
avoid issues with the potential to divide their party’s members and threaten the party’s agenda 
(e.g. Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug, 2008; Cox and McCubbins, 2005).  As a result, free votes are 
often allowed only when parties are internally divided between groups of MPs with very strong 
and/or divergent preferences.  Because the issues normally decided as free votes are non-random, 
future research examining whether the party identification of MPs impacts voting behaviour 
more generally will need to examine whipped divisions as well.   
That being said, it is not too premature to acknowledge that the findings presented here 
compel researchers to take the possibility of party identification effects on MPs’ voting 
behaviour more seriously in future research.  If additional scholarship addressing the 
shortcomings in the research design of this study continues to find evidence supporting the party-
as-identification argument, then this would require re-evaluation of the role that ‘party’ plays in 
shaping the voting behaviour of MPs.   
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Table 1: The Representativeness of the British Representation Study Sample Relative to the Outcome of 
Each Division (by Party) 
 
       Division     
   Crime and Disorder Act  Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act   
   Amendment   2nd Reading 2nd Reading 3rd Reading 
Party   (1998)    (1999)  (2000)  (2000) 
Labour   95.6 (94.9)   94.8 (94.1) 97.5 (96.3) 98.2 (96.7) 
Conservative  14.7 (16.3)   6.3 (11.1) 11.0 (21.6) 11.6 (18.6) 
Liberal Democrat 91.2 (91.7)   90.3 (90.0) 84.2 (84.6) 92.9 (89.5) 
Entries are the percentages of each party’s MPs voting ‘aye’ on each division (with the sample 
percentages observed in the British Representation Study sample in parentheses).   
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Table 2: Determinants of Support for Four Divisions Regarding Age-of-Consent 
 
       Division    
    Amendment 2nd Reading 2nd Reading 3rd Reading  
Predictors   (1998)  (1999)  (2000)  (2000) 
Social Conservatism  -0.52*  -0.45*  -0.63*  -0.49* 
    (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.19) 
Church Attendance  -0.47  -0.39  -0.40  -0.18 
    (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.36)  (0.39) 
Left-Right Position  -0.44*  -0.06  -0.16  -0.29 
    (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.28) 
University Education  0.62  0.45  1.29  2.32* 
    (0.88)  (0.78)  (0.95)  (1.19) 
Female    0.68  2.32*  0.53  1.18 
    (1.33)  (1.27)  (1.30)  (1.47) 
% Christian   <-0.01  <-0.01  0.03  0.04 
    (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Conservative MPs   -2.44*  -4.17*  -3.24*  -3.89* 
    (1.04)  (1.29)  (1.23)  (1.44) 
Constant   8.33*  5.83  5.39  3.47 
    (4.46)  (3.60)  (3.60)  (4.02) 
LR X2     112.57* 104.66* 94.36*  112.57* 
% Correctly Classified  91%  93%  91%  93% 
McFadden’s R2   0.66  0.64  0.63  0.68 
n     148  143  133  149 
* p < 0.05, one-tailed tests.  Standard errors in parentheses.   
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Table 3: Predicted Effects of Each Variable on the Probability of Voting ‘Aye’ on Each Division 
 
                Division    
    Amendment 2nd Reading 2nd Reading 3rd Reading  
Predictors (range)  (1998)  (1999)  (2000)  (2000)   
Social Conservatism (0-16) -0.71  -0.74  -0.81  -0.40 
Church Attendance (0-4) -0.08  -0.08  -0.04  -0.01 
Left-Right Position (0-9) -0.34  -0.03  -0.05  -0.07 
University Education (0-1)  0.03   0.03   0.06   0.11 
Female (0-1)    0.02   0.04   0.01   0.01 
% Christian (40.7-87.3)  -0.01  <-0.01   0.04   0.03 
Conservative MPs (0-1) -0.27  -0.72  -0.38  -0.39 
Entries are the predicted changes in probabilities when moving from the minimum to the maximum value 
(holding all other variables at their median values).   
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1 Because the variable capturing attitudes towards homosexual relationships most closely 
measures the issue at hand, we also ran models substituting the social conservatism scale with 
this one variable alone.  The results produced by these alternative models were substantively 
identical to those presented here.   
2 Data for this variable are only available for England and Wales.  Recognising this excludes 
Scottish MPs, we re-estimated each model using multiple imputation, which produced findings 
substantively equivalent to those presented here.   
3 We also explored the possibility that MPs with more socially conservative values have more 
intense preferences against each bill than more socially liberal MPs by estimating alternative 
model specifications including a quadratic term for the social conservatism variable. The results 
of these robustness tests were substantively equivalent to those presented here.  
